Showing posts with label IVF. Show all posts
Showing posts with label IVF. Show all posts
Tuesday, February 18, 2014
US IVF Conceptions at All-time High
1.5% of babies born in the US in 2012 were conceived via IVF, according to data just released by the Society for Assisted Reproductive Technologies. Transfers of multiple embryos were down compared to previous years, but the average number of embryos transferred was still 1.9 for women under 35, and higher for older women. An old piece of mine at the Hastings Center Forum on the relationship of US insurance law to multiple-embryo transfers is still available here; it dates back to the Octo-mom story, but its point is still relevant. The rough punchline is, if you don't insure people for assisted reproduction, folks who can only afford one expensive try at having children will opt for multiple-embryo transfers, both in order to enhance their chances at successful implantation and in order to achieve a whole family at one go. This, naturally, results in multiple births--which are considerably more risky both for mom and for kids than are singleton births.
Thursday, January 30, 2014
IVF and Non-Identity, Continued
Iain Brassington, over at the Journal of Medical Ethics blog, has posted a nice response to my post, IVF Babies at Enhanced Risk. But Why, and So What? In that post I raised the question (based on Derek Parfit's non-identity problem) whether an IVF baby born with a disability has any right to complain, since that baby would not exist if it weren't for the IVF which resulted in the disability. This argument seems logical to me, but it also troubles me, because it often seems capable of proving too much. I gave the example of the slave, to whom (in the right circumstances) one might plausibly argue, "You have no right to complain of being a slave, since without the institution of slavery you would never have been born." Another similarly-structured argument might be addressed to animals being bred in awful conditions by agri-business: "You have no right to complain, little piggy, because if it weren't for this horrific factory farm, you wouldn't exist at all." (Of courses, both the slave and the animal would have grounds for complaint if their lives were so wretched as not to be worth living--but that's a high (or a low) bar.
Iain suggests a couple of ways to think about the problem. One involves the idea that the non-identity argument is weakened if it's at least possible that the very same person could have been born without the complained-of injury. The very same person might have been born not a slave. But I think that's fiddling with the hypo. If we're talking about the person who owes his existence to the institution of slavery because, for example, his mother met his father only because they were sold to the same plantation, I don't see what leverage is gained by arguing that it's at least metaphysically possible that the same person could have been born outside the peculiar institution.
More promising, to me, is Iain's suggestion that an IVF baby might have been harmed, but not wronged, by being born, just as the slave of a benevolent master would still be wronged by the institution of slavery, even if she has not been harmed by it. This leaves us with the question, when we debate about the existence of a complaint "from a particular person's point of view," are we talking about complaints of wrongdoing, of harm, or (as in tort) only of harmful wrongdoing?
Finally Iain tries to distinguish the case of the disabled IVF baby from the case of a baby harmed in utero (as when mom drinks, or ingests Thalidomide). The second sort of baby, Iain argues, would clearly have a complaint about the harmful behavior, because the very same baby might have been born unharmed.
But as I said briefly in my comment to Iain's post, I'm not so sure that personal identity is genetic at root. I don't think it's too much to argue that the disabled baby is a different person from the genetically-identical baby that would have been born but for mom's behavior. So the non-identity problem is not solved by reference to continuity of genetic makeup, or even by reference to bodily continuity with the same blastocyst.
Iain suggests a couple of ways to think about the problem. One involves the idea that the non-identity argument is weakened if it's at least possible that the very same person could have been born without the complained-of injury. The very same person might have been born not a slave. But I think that's fiddling with the hypo. If we're talking about the person who owes his existence to the institution of slavery because, for example, his mother met his father only because they were sold to the same plantation, I don't see what leverage is gained by arguing that it's at least metaphysically possible that the same person could have been born outside the peculiar institution.
More promising, to me, is Iain's suggestion that an IVF baby might have been harmed, but not wronged, by being born, just as the slave of a benevolent master would still be wronged by the institution of slavery, even if she has not been harmed by it. This leaves us with the question, when we debate about the existence of a complaint "from a particular person's point of view," are we talking about complaints of wrongdoing, of harm, or (as in tort) only of harmful wrongdoing?
Finally Iain tries to distinguish the case of the disabled IVF baby from the case of a baby harmed in utero (as when mom drinks, or ingests Thalidomide). The second sort of baby, Iain argues, would clearly have a complaint about the harmful behavior, because the very same baby might have been born unharmed.
But as I said briefly in my comment to Iain's post, I'm not so sure that personal identity is genetic at root. I don't think it's too much to argue that the disabled baby is a different person from the genetically-identical baby that would have been born but for mom's behavior. So the non-identity problem is not solved by reference to continuity of genetic makeup, or even by reference to bodily continuity with the same blastocyst.
Sunday, January 26, 2014
Infertility Funding in the UK
The UK's National Infertility Awareness Campaign has published the results of its recent audit of infertility-treatment provision in the UK. The UK's own National Institute for Health and Care Excellence (NICE) recommends providing 3 full cycles to IVF to women under 40 who have not conceived after two years of unprotected intercourse or 12 cycles of artificial insemination. But the Awareness Campaign's audit shows that, for funding reasons, 73% of Clinical Consulting Groups in the UK do not offer treatment up to the NICE guideline standard. Of the 198 Clinical Consulting Groups that do offer some funding for IVF, 49% offered only one cycle and another 24% only two. Only 24% of the CCGs that fund IVF actually offer all three recommended cycles.
Thursday, January 9, 2014
IVF Babies at Enhanced Risk. But Why, and So What?
This Australian study in PLOS One shows significant risk of health problems in babies born from assisted conception as opposed to spontaneous conceptions. Compared to spontaneously-conceived singletons, singletons from assisted conception
were almost twice
as likely to be stillborn, more than twice as likely to be pre-term,
almost three times as likely to have very low birth weight, and twice as
likely to die within the first four weeks after birth. Outcomes varied by type of assisted conception. Very low and
low birth weight, very preterm and preterm birth, and neonatal death
were "markedly" more common in births from IVF and, to a lesser
degree, in births from ICSI. Use of frozen embryos elminated the risks of ICSI, but not of IVF. But frozen embryos also had increased risk
of macrosomia.
The study mentions, but doesn't linger on, data showing that kids spontaneously born of parents with untreated infertility problems also have adverse outcomes compared to kids of non-infertile parents. Compared to spontaneously conceived children of women with no infertility problems, spontaneously conceived children of women with infertility problems were nine times more likely to have very low birth weight, seven times more likely to be very pre-term, and almost seven times more likely to die within the first 28 days of birth. Some experts say that this may mean that the problems experienced by children of assisted reproduction may be more due to parental infertility than to infertility treatment.
Let us leave aside the possibility that many or most IVF-related risks are really just infertility-related risks. The sort of data discussed in this study always brings to my mind some variations on the "non-identity" problem invented by Derek Parfit. Suppose a child of IVF is born with low birthweight, and experiences lifelong significant complications which were foreseeable by the parents when they decided to used IVF. Has that child any complaint against the parents? One possible answer is, "No, because the condition of the possibility of that particular child's ever existing at all was his or her parents' use of the IVF which caused both his or her existence and his or her low birthweight. Only a child whose life was so wretched as to literally not be worth living could complain about his or her parents' use of IVF." The argument in this form seems sound but it also troubles me, because (for example) one can easily imagine the circumstances in which one might accurately say to a slave, "You have no right to complain about being born a slave, because without the institution of slavery, you would never have been born at all."
If IVF is risky, and a child of IVF is born with a disability, and the child would not have been born without IVF, what sort of complaint can one mount, from the child's point of view, about the disability?
The study mentions, but doesn't linger on, data showing that kids spontaneously born of parents with untreated infertility problems also have adverse outcomes compared to kids of non-infertile parents. Compared to spontaneously conceived children of women with no infertility problems, spontaneously conceived children of women with infertility problems were nine times more likely to have very low birth weight, seven times more likely to be very pre-term, and almost seven times more likely to die within the first 28 days of birth. Some experts say that this may mean that the problems experienced by children of assisted reproduction may be more due to parental infertility than to infertility treatment.
Let us leave aside the possibility that many or most IVF-related risks are really just infertility-related risks. The sort of data discussed in this study always brings to my mind some variations on the "non-identity" problem invented by Derek Parfit. Suppose a child of IVF is born with low birthweight, and experiences lifelong significant complications which were foreseeable by the parents when they decided to used IVF. Has that child any complaint against the parents? One possible answer is, "No, because the condition of the possibility of that particular child's ever existing at all was his or her parents' use of the IVF which caused both his or her existence and his or her low birthweight. Only a child whose life was so wretched as to literally not be worth living could complain about his or her parents' use of IVF." The argument in this form seems sound but it also troubles me, because (for example) one can easily imagine the circumstances in which one might accurately say to a slave, "You have no right to complain about being born a slave, because without the institution of slavery, you would never have been born at all."
If IVF is risky, and a child of IVF is born with a disability, and the child would not have been born without IVF, what sort of complaint can one mount, from the child's point of view, about the disability?
Labels:
assisted reproduction,
Australia,
birth defects,
Derek Parfit,
disability,
ICSI,
IVF,
non-identity,
PLOS One,
prematurity
Monday, January 30, 2012
Gingrich Would Ban Stem Cell Research, Regulate IVF
Newt Gingrich is telling conservative audiences in Florida that, if elected, he will ban all human embryonic stem-cell research, including research done on excess embryos from fertility clinics. He regards embryonic stem-cell research as "the use of science to desensitize society over the killing of babies." This is a reversal of positions he took in two different interviews in 2001, in which he expressed support for federally funding research on leftover fertility-clinic embryos which would otherwise be discarded. Over this weekend Gingrich also indicated that he would create a commission to look into the ethics of IVF: “I believe life begins at conception, and the question I was raising was what happens to embryos in fertility clinics, and I would favor a commission to look seriously at the ethics of how we manage fertility clinics....If you have in vitro fertilization, you are creating life; therefore, we should look seriously at what the rules should be for clinics that are doing that, because they are creating life.”
The roughly $125 million saved by cutting all of NIH's human embryonic stem-cell research funding could presumably be used to help offset some of the billions and billions of dollars required to create the new moon-base Gingrich says he wants by the end of his second term.
The roughly $125 million saved by cutting all of NIH's human embryonic stem-cell research funding could presumably be used to help offset some of the billions and billions of dollars required to create the new moon-base Gingrich says he wants by the end of his second term.
Friday, November 25, 2011
Sperm Donor Anonymity
Have a look at this video, courtesy of BioEdge, on the children of anonymous sperm donors. As I've said before, this issue is one of the top bioethics stories of the year. Is there good reason to keep sperm donors anonymous? Several countries have abolished anonymity, and sperm donations haven't dried up....
Labels:
ART,
assisted reproduction,
comparative bioethics,
IVF,
sperm donor
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